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I. Introduction  
 
The UN Secretary-General and the World Health Organisation have described the level of 
misinformation and disinformation surrounding the Covid-19 pandemic as an infodemic .2 
Misinformation and disinformation are often referred to as  .3 While both involve 
the spread of false or misleading information, misinformation is typically spread by people 
who do not realise that the information is false. By contrast, with disinformation, the person 
sharing the information knows it is false and usually shares it with the intent to cause harm.4 
Since the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic, two major patterns of misinformation and 
disinformation online have emerged. First, racist, xenophobic and hateful messages and 
memes have been shared online, blaming and scapegoating particular groups for the origin 
and spread of Covid-19.5 Second, misinformation has spread on the causes, symptoms 
and possible treatment of the virus.  In this paper, we focus on the effects of the spread of 
misinformation which, if followed, could result in significant harm to health and, in extreme 
situations, life.6  
 
This paper explores the responses that states and social media companies have taken to 
address misinformation on the causes, symptoms, and possible treatment of Covid-19 and 
assesses their compliance with existing obligations under international human rights 
standards and norms, including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
Addressing misinformation typically requires a plurality of measures, such as media 
literacy programmes, promotion of good journalism, increased transparency on 
advertising, in some circumstances, content moderation, and supervision by courts and 
regulators.7 For reasons of space, this chapter focuses on the three main approaches 
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taken by states and businesses to address Covid-19 misinformation. These are, at one 
end of the spectrum, the actions taken by states and social media platforms to meet their 
obligations under the right to the highest attainable standard of health (right to health) 
through  8 At the other end of the spectrum, the  
content removal policies and their compatibility with the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights and the  application of criminal laws to address misinformation 
and the associated risks to human rights.  
 
II. Information Accessibility 
 
In recent years, there has been a surge in online misinformation, including in the field of 
public health. The Covid-19 pandemic, however, has taken public health misinformation to 
a new level. Incomplete and continuously evolving scientific understanding of this novel 
virus and how it can be effectively treated, as well as the lack of a vaccine, have created 
the conditions for misinformation to flourish. This includes misinformation on possible 
treatments or cures for Covid-19, such as recommendations to eat garlic, drink bleach, 
consume high volumes of alcohol, and use ultraviolet lights.9 Following some of this 
misinformation could have serious health repercussions and at the most extreme, result in 
death. For instance, journalists reported that in Iran, viral online misinformation surfaced 
about the beneficial effects of ingesting methanol and alcohol-based sanitisers to protect 
against the virus. This reportedly led to hundreds of people ingesting large quantities of 
the two substances, causing the death of over 300 people and serious illness.10  
 
The right to the highest attainable standard of health (right to health) includes  
 defined by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as 
 right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas concerning health .11 
Education and public awareness campaigns are widely recognised as a baseline measure 
to address misinformation, although on their own cannot provide a full solution to 
misinformation.12 This is both because of the increasing sophistication of misinformation, 
which makes it more difficult to detect, and because these measures place a too heavy 
burden on the individual, without addressing the root causes of misinformation. However, 
when combined with other approaches, media literacy programmes constitute an important 
and necessary measure for providing individuals with the tools to self-assess the reliability 
of some pieces of information. In the Covid-19 context, meeting this dimension to the right 
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to health is particularly important given the virality of misinformation on Covid-19 on social 
media platforms.13  
 
a) State Action on Information Accessibility 
 
Some states have introduced educational and public awareness campaigns to counter 
misinformation on Covid-19.14 For instance, several countries, such as the UK, have 
partnered with the WHO on the  the  campaign, where they commit to using 
public broadcast channels to counter misinformation and promote public health advice.15 
The UK has also established a  response  with health experts, designed to  
the spread of falsehoods and rumours which could cost .16 The Indian Government 
has launched a WhatsApp chatbot to counter Covid-19 related misinformation.17  
 
The nature and extent of actions that states are required to take to ensure  
 is not well developed under international human rights law. However, the 
Covid-19 infodemic  raises a number of interesting questions on the scope of the 
obligation. First, the question arises whether general public awareness campaigns that 
address key myths concerning Covid-19 are sufficient, or whether states are under an 
obligation to tailor their messages to the specific types of misinformation in circulation, 
given that some misinformation on possible treatments is country-specific. Misinformation 
may also relate to particular groups, which, if left unaddressed in public health messaging, 
could raise issues of discrimination.  
 
Second, the question arises whether   entails an expectation of 
timeliness, given that time may be of the essence when health misinformation has gone 
viral. Finally, the means by which states adopt public health awareness campaigns on 
Covid-19 may also be critical as misinformation that spreads online, often then spreads 
offline, including through families and friends. In light of the ongoing digital divide, it is likely 
to be insufficient for states to focus public health awareness campaigns exclusively on 
digital media; other actions may also be required, such as public messaging by post, public 
broadcasting and billboards. It is unclear the extent to which states have taken these types 
of questions into account when developing campaigns to counter misinformation in their 
country.  
 
A particularly serious dimension to misinformation on Covid-19 has been the role of 
political leaders, including heads of state or government, in amplifying misinformation. For 
example, videos and tweets by Brazil s President Bolsonaro have circulated widely in 
which he claimed that Covid-19 is not more dangerous than a normal flu for people with a 
healthy lifestyle.18 President Trump has been at the centre of several claims that drinking 
or injecting bleach and hitting  body with tremendous ultraviolet or powerful  would 
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contribute to defeating the virus, against medical advice.19 The involvement of political 
leaders in the spread of misinformation both amplifies it, securing wider reach, and may 
have the effect of validating the misinformation, potentially giving the impression that it is 
 advice. General Comment 14 of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights includes as part of  obligations to protect the right to health, a 
prohibition of  misrepresenting health-related .20 The question 
therefore arises whether in such contexts, the amplification of misinformation by state 





Tech companies and social media platforms have been particularly active in addressing 
Covid-19 mis/disinformation, signaling a distinct approach to how they address other forms 
of mis and disinformation on their platforms. This has included the issuance of a joint 
statement by Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Reddit, Twitter and YouTube in 
which, for the first time, they publicly committed to joining forces to address 
misinformation.21  
 
In the past few years, tech and social media companies have been developing different 
responses to mis- and disinformation.22 They have generally taken a cautious approach 
and have not yet introduced measures to address some of the fundamental enablers of 
these phenomena, such as the business model behind digital advertising; the challenge of 
assessing what constitutes mis- or disinformation; and the extensive protection given to 
freedom of political expression by the US constitution.23 By contrast, in relation to Covid-
19, major tech companies have taken a proactive approach to counter health 
misinformation, partnering with international organisations and national health institutions, 
addressing the issues of monetisation of content and digital ads and introducing new 
definitions of what constitute misinformation for Covid-related content.  
 
A common response by tech companies has been to  content from the WHO and 
other national health bodies to users searching for information on Covid-19, in order to 
counter misinformation with trusted information from recognised health authorities. This 
has been also supported by the  initiative launched by the UN to provide a platform 
with trusted and accurate content about Covid-19.24 Google has launched an SOS Alert 
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enter the search terms, -  or 25 YouTube has also added a banner 
redirecting users to the WHO web portal on all videos that reference Covid-19.26 Similarly, 
the search function on Facebook has been altered so that any user searching for topics 
related to Covid-19 on Facebook is shown results encouraging them to look at the website 
of the WHO or national health authorities for the latest information.27 The order of the 
newsfeed has also been changed to prioritise these websites in users' newsfeeds. 
Likewise, WhatsApp has worked with the WHO to create a Health Alert system that is 
designed to answer questions from the public about Covid-19 and provides prompt, reliable 
and official information 24 hours a day and worldwide and in several languages.28  
 
As a general matter, the prioritisation of content can be seen as a less invasive approach 
than content removal.29 However, in some circumstances, where deprioritised content is 
placed so low on a feed that it may never be seen by a social media user, it may have the 
same effect as content removal.30 Content prioritisation can therefore raise questions 
around freedom of expression, particularly if the prioritisation process results in the 
exclusion of particular voices or perspectives from the social media space.31 These wider 
concerns about content prioritisation may be distinguishable from a narrow and temporary 
context of a public health pandemic, where information from national public health 
authorities and the WHO designated as trusted partners is elevated over other content. 
This may be seen as a necessary, legitimate and proportionate restriction over other health 
messages, in order to ensure that social media users see the most up to date health 
information on Covid-19 and to combat misinformation.  
 
Social media companies have also taken the decision to restrict advertising and de-
monetise certain content as a means of deterring users from uploading particularly 
shocking or attractive content on the virus only for getting higher revenues. The business 
model of digital advertising is based on  views and, therefore, videos with higher 
numbers of views are more lucrative and ads featured on these videos will generate more 
revenue for the platform. This has been considered as one of the obstacles to effectively 
addressing online misinformation and its human rights impacts.32 YouTube decided to de-
monetise all Covid-19 related videos and does not allow ads on them.33However, after 
pressure from a news agency complaining about significant loss due to these restrictions, 
YouTube has already made some exceptions, such as allowing monetisation on videos 
coming from respectable  news agencies.34  
 

















Following a similar approach, Facebook has banned ads and listings of any alleged 
alternative cure for the virus (not supported by health authorities), thus reducing its 
potential revenue. At the same time, the social media platform has also granted the WHO 
unlimited free ad space and some free space to national health organisations.35 A similar 
initiative has been also implemented by Twitter, which, despite its standard policy of not 
allowing political ads, decided to let governmental health authorities advertise links to 
trustworthy information.36  
 
III. Content Removal 
 
In addition to elevating content from the WHO and national public health authorities, social 
media platforms have modified their content moderation policies to more effectively fact-
check and/or remove Covid misinformation, with an increased reliance on automated 
systems.37 As a general matter, the main structural problem platforms face with moderating 
misinformation is the difficulty, and sometimes impossibility, of assessing with objectivity 
and certainty the veracity of information without actually making or being seen to be making 
value, moral or political judgments on particular forms of speech or risking censorship and 
unduly restricting freedom of expression.38 However, social media platforms appear to 
have taken a different approach to health misinformation on Covid-19.39 
 
For instance, Facebook has decided to remove any  claim and conspiracy theory that 
have been flagged by leading global health  and that causes immediate harm 
to users.40 This is distinct from misinformation that does not  result in physical  
which is referred to the fact-checkers and, if rated false, is explicitly labelled as such and 
demoted on  news feeds.41  
 
Twitter has taken a similar approach and has also changed its definition of harm and what 
constitutes harmful content. Prior to the pandemic, a post was considered harmful only if 
a user reported it. Once reported, the platform would assess it and take action where it 
deemed necessary. Twitter has now decided to take a more proactive approach to content 
removal. As explained in its blog by  Customers and Legal, Policy and Trust & 
Safety leads, any content that  directly against guidance from authoritative sources 
of global and local public  will be assessed and, if needed, removed,42 without 
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March 2020 (updated at 1 April 2020), https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/An-update-on-
our-continuity-strategy-during-COVID-19.html. 
While these new approaches to dealing with Covid-19 misinformation apply to general 
users, they are limited in application if the person spreading the misinformation is a public 
figure. For example, according to  policy on fact-checking, political ads and 
political content is exempt from this check to preserve full freedom of political expression, 
fundamental in a democratic society.43 In line with this, Facebook decided not to remove 
any of Trump  posts, even those going against WHO recommendations.44 Twitter has 
adopted a different stance by stating that it would add labels correcting misinformation  
anyone sharing misleading information that meets the requirement of our policy, including 
world 45 For instance, on non-Covid-19 related posts, Twitter has recently fact-
checked and hidden two posts by Trump that were deemed, respectively, to be false and 
glorifying violence.46
 
While, on their face, the policies appear to be straightforward, there is very little public 
information on the types of content that social media platforms have deemed to fall under 
these policies. This is particularly important to understand given that the removal of content 
depends on the interpretation of whether a piece of content  results in physical 
 which is likely to involve a complex and subjective assessment. This is likely to be 
accentuated further considering that the determination is now made mostly through 
automation, due to many of the human content moderators being furloughed or relocated 
to other tasks.47 Without transparency and greater information on how these decisions are 
being made, it is difficult to assess the scale and breadth of their application and their 
compatibility with freedom of expression in practice.48  
 
Internal grievance mechanisms constitute a key safeguard against overly broad content 
removal. Again, however, it is unclear how quickly these processes are able to deal with 
appeals and very little data are available on the nature and outcomes of such appeals, 
thus limiting our understanding of how they protect freedom of expression and the right to 
a remedy under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.49  
 
IV. The Application of Criminal Law 
 
Finally, some states have applied their criminal law, either by using existing anti-
disinformation laws (many of which cover misinformation of the type discussed in this 
chapter) or by adopting new ones. For instance, Singapore is reported to have used its 
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including false claims on how the virus spread.50 Resort to this law to deal with Covid-19 
raises a number of concerns from a human rights perspective. As the NGO Article 19 
argued when it was first enacted, the definition of disinformation is very vague, which risks 
broad and subjective application.51 The penalties are also particularly severe with up to 10 
years of imprisonment. As a result, the concern is that the law has a chilling effect on 
freedom of expression without actually addressing the spread of misinformation, including 
on Covid-19.52 Thailand is also reported to have applied its anti-disinformation laws to deal 
with misleading information about the spread of the virus.53  
 
In other countries that do not have dedicated anti-disinformation laws, existing criminal 
laws have been interpreted to include misinformation. For instance, in India, one-hundred 
people have reportedly been arrested on charges related to spreading misinformation 
about the virus,54 following a broad interpretation of the existing provisions in the Indian 
Penal Code.55 Individual states have also introduced specific legislation, such as the state 




Other states have approved new legislation that criminalises Covid-19 misinformation. An 
 those spreading misinformation during 
57 
58 However, 
journalists and NGOs have criticised the measure as a possible gateway for censorship of 
independent journalists and dissenting voices in the country.59 
 
The criminalisation of misinformation through general anti-disinformation laws, specific 
Covid-19 legislation or the application of general criminal law has been criticised for its 
incompatibility with international human rights law.60 Many anti-disinformation laws are 
vaguely formulated, with unclear guidance on implementation and often with excessive 
50 Ibid and Shibani Mahtani,   introduced tough laws against fake news. Coronavirus has put 
them to  The Washington Post, 16 March 2020; Kirsten Han,  How effective Is 
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Rights, 12 February 2020, https://aseanmp.org/2020/02/12/stop-fake-news-laws-coronavirus/ 




57 Shaun Walker,  journalists fear coronavirus law may be use to jail  The Guardian, 3 
April 2020. 
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sanctions. As such, they can infringe freedom of expression directly, as enshrined in Article 
19 UDHR and ICCPR, and can produce a chilling effect, where users refrain from 
exercising their freedom of expression because of the fear of the possible punishment.61 
Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, these laws were already criticized as posing 
responsibility on the platforms.62 
 
Anti-disinformation laws remain a problematic measure, even under the exceptional 
circumstances of a pandemic.63 As repeatedly warned by Access Now and Article 19, 
64 ort 
65 Indeed, according to Access Now, criminal law is not an 
66 Rather, they recommend addressing the 
issue through different responses that do not pose further threats to human rights, such as 
media and digital literacy and stronger data protection laws. 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
The Covid-19 pandemic has illustrated the serious impact misinformation can have on 
individuals and society, both directly by threatening the rights to health or life of the 
individuals who believe the misinformation and act upon it, and indirectly, by undermining 
public health initiatives.  
 
The approaches adopted by states and tech companies underscore the ongoing need to 
identify the parameters of human rights-compliant approaches to dealing with 
misinformation. This is a continuing challenge as many approaches are necessary but 
insufficient while others are overly broad and introduce new challenges.  
 
At one end of the spectrum, the critical importance of access to media pluralism and 
accurate and reliable information as a baseline for addressing misinformation has been 
underlined by both states and tech  approaches to Covid-19 misinformation. 
This aligns with the plea by the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression67 and 
the work that UN agencies such as UNESCO are undertaking to enhance digital and media 
literacy and  j  more generally.68 In this regard, social media platforms have 
adopted new approaches to elevating content in order to ensure that users are exposed to 
61 
47), 42. 
62 Ibid. See also, Joi
(UN) Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-
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accurate and reliable information. Questions arise, however, on whether this type of 
approach is contained to public health misinformation, particularly due to the possibility of 
partnerships with national public health authorities and the WHO, or whether it can  or 
should - be replicated in other contexts. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, the Covid-19 pandemic has underscored the wider risks 
to human rights posed by approaches to counter misinformation through overly broad 
content removal processes, the adoption of dedicated anti-disinformation laws and the 
extension of the criminal law to deal with misinformation.69 In particular, the over-reliance 
on automated systems to remove content and not simply flag it can raise significant 
problems as well as the definition of which kind of political speech should be subject to 
content moderation rules. As these approaches have serious consequences for human 
rights, the  raises the urgent need to identify measures that are compatible with 
international human rights law, so that mis and disinformation can be effectively addressed 
without introducing new risks to human rights in the process. This can only be achieved 
through increased transparency, thorough human rights due diligence, meaningful multi-
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